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Abstract. This article seeks to develop a concept of ‘security governance’ in the context of
post-Cold War Europe. The validity of a governance approach lies in its ability to locate some
of the distinctive ways in which European security has been coordinated, managed and
regulated. Based on an examination of the way governance is utilised in other political fields
of political analysis, the article identifies the concept of security governance as involving the
coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the
interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and
informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed
toward particular policy outcomes. Three issues are examined to demonstrate the utility of
the concept of security governance for understanding security in post-Cold War Europe: the
transformation of NATO, the Europeanisation of security accomplished through EU-led
initiatives and, finally, the resultant dynamic relationship between forms of exclusion and
inclusion in governance.
Introduction
Thinking about European security has been shaped by a series of different ideas and
concepts over the past quarter of a century: an architecture, regime, community.
However, it has not been subjected to an account through the lens of governance.
Given the application of the concept to a range of other thematic areas, this is
rather surprising. This article seeks to explore ‘security governance’ in the context of
post-Cold War Europe. The validity of a governance approach lies in its ability to
locate some of the distinctive ways in which European security has been co-
ordinated, managed and regulated. Three issues are chosen to illustrate this: the
transformation of NATO, the Europeanisation of security accomplished through
EU-led initiatives and, finally, the resultant dynamic relationship between forms of
exclusion and inclusion in governance.
The timing of research into security governance in Europe might be seen to be
rather challenging. From a series of arguments about the nature and balance of
institutional responsibilities, to debates over the role of institutions in the global
‘war on terror’, to the seeming marginalisation of those institutions in the war in
Iraq, it has been difference that has seemingly been the hallmark of European
security interaction. Indeed, this might raise a question about why think in terms of
governance now; why at all? Other frameworks are viable, networks perhaps most
obviously. Governance is, however, an obvious choice, not least because in a sense, it
is the concept that policymakers have sought to develop. Governance also encom-
passes many of the central themes of European security: the importance of ideas, of
institutions and both formal and informal structures, of multiple actors purposefully
motivated. Security governance might also be able to emphasise key strengths of
other approaches: being based on both shared epistemologies (as with epistemic
communities) and on shared ontologies (as with sociological institutionalism).
Governance and security governance
The concept of governance has, of course, been widely applied in Political Science.
Moreover, it has been used in a variety of ways in the International Relations (IR)
literature. That there is a security dimension to governance is thus not conceptually
untoward. For the purposes of this article, as applied to European security,
governance involves the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple
and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending
upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and
norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes.
That said, the term has been victim to use and abuse. ‘Governance’ has become
one of those terms that is utilised by so many, in so many different fashions, that it
begins to defy clear definition. The notion of ‘global governance’ has become
familiar in the vocabulary of IR and it is now accompanied by sundry, more specific
applications: environmental governance, trade governance, international monetary
governance and so on. The term has also become commonplace amongst inter-
national organisations. The European Commission has adopted a series of measures
expressly aimed at improving ‘European governance’; the IMF and the World Bank
have, since the 1980s, been concerned with promoting ‘good governance’ in their
lending policies; and the UN through its Department of Political Affairs and the
UN Development Programme has a specific commitment to the promotion of
democratisation and governance. These examples are not meant to suggest that the
term has been knowingly misapplied, only that it has been used so often and in so
many different ways that its analytical precision has been blunted. Rod Rhodes has
observed that the ‘problems of definition [… are] acute’ and at least six separate and
broad uses of the term governance can be identified.2 In a similar vein, George
Pagoulatos has noted, ‘[t]he term “governance” has been extensively used in the
literature and begs for clarification. All too often its generic usage has tended to
become conflated with the substantive one. It is often unclear whether one is
referring to types of governance or to a governance type […].’3
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Such analytical eclecticism might be seen as an advantage insofar as it allows of
the use of a single and thus comparable concept across a range of issue areas or
activities in international life. Indeed, there exists a distinct body of work both
within IR and Political Science more broadly which has worked with governance in
a manner that has been intended to illustrate, to understand and to explain distinct
forms of political interaction. This body of work is, of course, familiar to those
working on the EU, or domestically with regard to local government and the
management of social, welfare, economic and other spheres of public policy.4
Governance by this view has specific meanings and particular applications. In what
follows, the particular relevance of the concept to security will be examined.
One of the key propositions of the governance literature – that governance is a
phenomenon that is distinct from government – is of course highly significant.
Government traditionally understood is suggestive of centralised authority, vertical
and hierarchical forms of regulation, and an ability to impose policy preferences, by
coercive means if necessary. Governance, by contrast, is concerned with under-
standing how the regulation of societies has been supplemented by the roles of
political actors other than government as such.5 In the international realm, the
distinction is of particular relevance given the absence of an ‘overarching
governmental authority’ yet the existence of ‘a modicum of order [and] of routinised
arrangements’ that sustain ‘global life’.6 This is close to what Bob Jessop has
referred to in a different context as the ‘heterarchy of self-organisation’7 and
assumes the existence of multiple centres of power and thus a multiplicity of
combined and coordinated actions taken in response to the increasingly complex
challenges of governing in a globalising world.8
The actors involved in this process of self-organisation are numerous. As the
Commission on Global Governance has noted, ‘[g]overnance is the sum of the many
ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs’.9
Such a formulation suggests a move away from state-centrism and, indeed, gover-
nance perspectives are characterised by an attention to ‘institutions, corporate
interests, civil society, and transnational organisations’ as well as the state and
government.10 Indeed, even in the security sphere – an area traditionally reserved for
the state – non-state actors have become increasingly significant in the implement-
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6 James Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order and Change in World Politics’, in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto
Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 7.
7 Bob Jessop, ‘The Changing Governance of Welfare: Recent Trends in its Primary Functions, Scale
and Modes of Coordination’, Social Policy and Administration, 33:4 (1999), p. 351. Heterarchy refers
to forms of coordinated behaviour that are distinct from modes such as anarchy (for example, the free
market) or hierarchy (vertical coordination by the state/government).
8 James Rosenau, ‘Change, Complexity, and Governance in Globalising Space’, in Pierre (ed.),
Debating Governance, p. 172; and Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the State
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 59–60.
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Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 2.
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ation and monitoring of security policies. This is a process that accords with a
broadened meaning of security. To long-established actors in the defence industry
have been added an increased number of charities, environmental organisations,
human rights watchdogs, medical organisations and think-tanks. Further, the
privatisation of armaments industries in Western Europe from the 1990s and the
professionalisation of armed forces have led to a shift from national autonomy in
security affairs to new forms of public-private partnership.11 In some circumstances,
governments are also finding it more efficient to hire private firms for international
tasks rather than attempting to muster the relevant resources themselves.12
These processes notwithstanding, in the sphere of security governance, states and
the international organisations through which they act remain the primary actors.
This is an empirical, rather than a theoretical point. The state may increasingly be
pooling its sovereignty and decision-making capacity with other states in the face of
transnational and globalising influence. But in European security issues (and indeed,
arguably in many wider security issues) the state has remained resilient (albeit not
unaltered) in the face of these influences.13 The United States has successfully con-
verted a transnational threat (al Qaeda) into a state one, thus legitimising the use of
force to produce regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. This may not be the most
appropriate response or understanding of the nature of new threats. But it has
empirically reinforced the emphasis on the state. Individuals, societies and other
referents of security may be more important theoretically or normatively.14 However,
in regard to contemporary security issues (especially in Europe), states remain
dominant actors.15 States are still the agents through which the structures of
governance are instituted and financed, and the agents through which the efforts of
these structures are largely realised.16
This concentration on states notwithstanding, governance is not state-centric in
the neorealist sense. Indeed, both institutionalist and regime analyses are com-
patible with a governance perspective. Governance involves ‘formal institutions and
regimes […] as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either
have agreed to or perceive to be in their best interest.’17 How this interest is
generated is of some significance. Much institutionalist thought now recognises that
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the ‘rational prudence’ of actors does not fully explain their cooperative inter-
actions18 and that underlying beliefs and ideas are also important in explaining
action.19
An important step, then, is to stress that ideas or norms underpin governance. As
James Rosenau has argued, ‘[g]overnance is […] a system of rule that is as dependent
on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions […]’.20 This is a
logical consequence of the fact that governance is not dependent upon vertical
authority. In the absence of compulsion, collective action, while facilitated by
institutional mechanisms, remains dependent in the first instance upon a willingness
to act and a consistency of views on a desirable end state. Similarly, formal
interaction within institutionalised settings is predicated upon what Friis and Murphy
have dubbed ‘soft governance’ – ‘the development of norms and values which
condition […] actions’.21 Of principal significance in this regard is the norm of
legitimacy ‘the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’, a
crucial consideration because it confers authority upon governance structures.22
All of this, in turn, suggests that ideas matter in international politics23 and this is
particularly so in Europe where the ideational terrain has changed significantly since
the end of the Cold War. Ideas, however, do not ‘float freely’.24 They are embedded
in material structures and thus reflect and reproduce relationships of power.25 These
structures include states and international institutions broadly defined. The US, for
instance, represents a particularly powerful and hegemonic vehicle for the projection
of certain ideas of democracy, markets and institutional commitment. International
organisations such as NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe, meanwhile, are
receptacles of congruent ideas, and interpret and project them as appropriate norms
of international behaviour. It is these ideas or norms that facilitate the development
of a dominant model of governance in Europe and suggest an ability of dominant
international organisations to act as socialising agents both for their member states
and for aspirants and non-members within the region.26 But the fact that ideas do
The governance of European security 7
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social constructivism. See especially, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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the general proposition see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca,
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not ‘float freely’ means that there is a competition between actors on ideas to achieve
particular purposes in the security field and this imparts a dynamism to security
governance. Within the dominant Westernistic community of norms there has been
a debate about the merits of Euro-Atlantic approaches to security (encapsulated
within NATO) and Europeanist approaches (encapsulated within the EU). These
debates have been made more stark by the policy fall-out of September 11th 2001
and the associated ‘war on terrorism’, but they have a lineage that extends back
through the 1990s and into the period of the Cold War itself. More broadly, while
the post-Cold War period has not seen a competition of ideas as stark as during the
Cold War, the degree of acceptance of the dominant set of norms has been less than
total in some cases. Security governance is, however, rooted in this discourse; the
discourse concerns alternative modes of governance, not the subversion of security
governance itself.
Finally, the concept of security governance is underpinned by purposefulness.
James Rosenau has defined governance ‘as systems of rule, as the purposive activities
of any collectivity that sustain mechanisms designed to insure its safety, prosperity,
coherence, stability, and continuance’. He continues by suggesting that ‘governance
is about the maintenance of collective order, the achievement of collective goals, and
the collective processes of rule through which order and goals are sought’.27 Purpose
here can be understood as the outcome of both structure and process. In structural
terms, governance involves institutions (as discussed above) and these entrench
particular forms of behaviour among their participants by prescribing rules of entry,
norms of interaction and constraints on behaviour.28 In terms of process,
governance is concerned with policy outcomes and the manner in which actors
interact to define and achieve these. In this respect there is an assumption that ‘the
inclusion and influence of different actors could well change over time and across
sectors’.29 This suggests that the objectives of systems of governance reflect an
aggregate of preferences among actors. These preferences will often be similar but
on occasion they may be contested, the consequence of the competition of ideas
noted above. Specified policy outcomes can, of course, be obtained, for there are
circumstances in which agreed preferences can be manufactured and implemented.
However, it may be the case that these meet the objectives of a majority but not
necessarily of all actors.30
To recap, then, ‘security governance’ as set out above, comprises five features:
heterarchy; the interaction of a large number of actors, both public and private;
intitutionalisation that is both formal and informal; relations between actors that are
ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as much as by
formal regulations; and, finally, collective purpose. To consider security governance
in greater detail, three examples will be taken: the transformation of NATO,
‘Europeanisation’ and the interaction between inclusion and exclusion.
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NATO’s transformation
The key arena in which security governance in Europe has arguably emerged is
within and between international organisations. The principal actor in this regard is
NATO and it has obtained a pre-eminent position through a number of processes.31
NATO has retained and, indeed, invoked its formal collective defence function.
With the passing of the Cold War, collective defence may no longer occupy centre
stage in defining the Alliance’s purposes. However, obtaining protection under
Article V of the Washington Treaty retains a powerful allure and, whatever the mix
of motives, has been one factor in the demand for membership which has propelled
enlargement of the organisation in the 1990s and 2000s. In the European setting
there is no organisation that offers an equivalent guarantee. The collective defence
guarantee of the Western European Union (WEU) still lives on in a state of
suspended animation following the formal absorption of that organisation within
the EU, but Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty was, in any case, only ever
credible via a recourse to NATO. Further, following the September 11th 2001 attacks
on the US, NATO activated Article V for the first time in its history. In military
terms this meant little as the US campaign in Afghanistan was a largely American
affair conducted outside of NATO channels, but as a gesture of political solidarity it
was highly symbolic and signalled a precedent for collective action should similar
attacks occur against a European ally.32
Article V may remain firmly at the core of NATO, but the Alliance has also
undertaken a conscious engagement in the changed meaning of security in Europe.
The Strategic Concept of 1991 signified a conceptual move away from territorial
defence as the central preoccupation of the Alliance. The successor document, the
1999 Strategic Concept, noted a commitment to ‘a broad approach to security’ and
outlined a range of Alliance tasks over and above the more traditional ones
associated with defence and deterrence.33 What is significant here is that an attempt
at relevance has been maintained and that this has proved to be a motor to Alliance
actions. The process of transformation that has resulted has reflected and indeed
contributed to the growing complexity and diffusion in the governance of security in
Europe.
In terms of heterarchy, NATO though it has remained the central provider of
security in Europe, especially in the realm of military security, is not the sole
provider nor does it claim to be. The assumption by NATO of certain functions of
collective security,34 in particular new military missions or crisis management
operations in the form of out-of-area peacekeeping and peace enforcement
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operations, reflects the increasingly heterarchial nature of the governance of security
in Europe. NATO’s first step into this realm of collective security in 1992 was
conditioned by the principle it would be willing to act out-of-area as a military crisis
manager at the request of either the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE) or
the United Nations. NATO had publicly recognised before 1992 that these two
collective security organisations, among others, had an important role to play in
ensuring security in the complex environment emerging in Europe.35 The Alliance
stated unequivocally in its Rome Declaration in December 1991 that, ‘[t]he challenges
we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institu-
tion alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the
countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new
European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community,
the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other.’36 These other institu-
tions, however, lacked the military capabilities which were at times required for
effective security management (the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia being a
prominent case in point), and which the Atlantic Alliance could supply in a
complementary role. The principle of acting at the request of the OSCE or the UN, it
must be noted, was not upheld in the case of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Alliance
leaders argued at the time that the need to act overrode any preference to obtain
authority from the UN given that Russia appeared bound to veto a Security Council
resolution. Yet the authority of the UN proved enduring. Many NATO members were
uncomfortable with the absence of an explicit mandate and the importance of the UN
was swiftly resurrected. UNSCR 1244 of June 1999 furnished the formal framework
for the conclusion of NATO’s intervention and the consequent establishment of
KFOR, the NATO-led (but UN mandated) peacekeeping presence.
Fragmentation of security authority in Europe was given further impetus by
NATO through the development of the European Security and Defence Identity
(ESDI) concept, which was designed not only to enhance the ‘Europeanisation’ of
the Alliance itself but also to boost the ability of European states to act militarily
without the US, first under the aegis of the Western European Union and then, after
1999, under the umbrella of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP). NATO’s growing military relationship with the EU, though at times a cause
of dispute amongst Alliance member states, has facilitated the promotion of an
alternative source of military security in Europe. In line with this, NATO recently
handed over to the EU responsibility for providing military security in Macedonia37
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and the EU is actively interested in assuming from NATO responsibility for ensuring
military security in Bosnia.38
The multiplication of security actors involved at all levels in the management of
security affairs is an accompanying feature of the increased need for crisis manage-
ment in Europe and the desire for greater Europeanisation. Since the mid-1990s,
crisis management diplomacy in Europe has seldom been the sole responsibility of
one institution, rather two or more institutions often work together cooperatively. In
2001 NATO and the EU worked in tandem at the diplomatic level to diffuse a
brewing internal crisis in Macedonia, with each bringing different sets of possible
pressures and incentives to the resolution of the crisis. But the burgeoning of
security actors has been most evident in the provision of security on the ground. In
the Balkans, NATO works not only with the EU, OSCE and the UN in post-conflict
reconstruction efforts, but also with a range of public and private non-governmental
actors ranging from the International Committee of the Red Cross to private
contractors that are able to provide expertise and skills that NATO (or other
institutions) cannot furnish. The war on terrorism has further added to this
profusion of actors.39 Here cooperation includes a greater interaction in intelligence
sharing with a range of national level intelligence officials and national ministry
officials, national police forces, and corporate officials in the banking and investment
sectors. Moreover, NATO’s stated aim to support national governments in respond-
ing to biological and chemical disasters has opened up a requirement that it develop
at least a minimal working relationship with a whole new set of public officials that
are engaged in the field of disaster management.
At the institutional level, NATO very early pursued a political agenda to extend a
hand of friendship to its former enemies and to develop a policy of political
outreach to consult with them on security issues.40 The need to manage this policy of
political outreach has resulted over time in the establishment within NATO itself of
a set of interrelated formal bilateral and multilateral committees and meetings
designed to manage security issues with non-member states. Central is the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),41 a multilateral forum in which NATO’s 19
member states meet regularly with 27 partner countries ‘to discuss political and
security-related issues and develop cooperation in a wide range of areas’.42 The
membership of the EAPC overlaps with a range of other institutional initiatives by
NATO. One formal mechanism is the Partnership for Peace programme, which
operates on a bilateral (19+1) basis and is designed to facilitate security cooperation
with each partner country, including on matters of defence planning and budgeting,
The governance of European security 11
38 See Judy Dempsey, ‘Bosnia role boosts EU military ambitions’, FT.com, 25 February 2003,
<http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=
1045511101057&p=1012571727166> (25/02/03).
39 For a statement of the Alliance’s policy response to terrorism, see ‘Prague Summit Declaration:
Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Prague on 21 November 2002’ NATO Press Release 2002)127, 21 November 2002, para.
4d.
40 See ‘The London Declaration’.
41 The EAPC replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1997.
42 ‘The Birth and Development of the EAPC Idea’, NATO Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc.
htm> (15/06/03).
military exercises and civil emergency operations.43 NATO has further established
the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission to provide regular
forums for bilateral consultations in acknowledgment of the singular role these two
countries have in European security. NATO has also sought to institutionalise its
effort to develop mutual understanding with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia through its Mediterranean Dialogue process,
which includes bilateral meetings with each of these states (at 19+1) and multilateral
meetings through its Mediterranean Cooperation Group (at 19+7).44 Underlying
these formal forums NATO engages at the practical level in ongoing consultations
with each of the partner states in meetings and activities that deal with common
programmes in which these states participate with the Alliance. Much of this
proliferation of formal and informal relations relate to security, and in particular
military, matters, reflecting NATO’s primary area of expertise, but these ties also
extend to outreach projects on non-military related issues; for example, NATO’s
Science Committee runs projects with partner countries on matters such as the
environment and other science and technological issues.45 NATO, in its effort to
address a range of new issues and relationships has thus become an institutional
structure within which a number of new formal bodies operate, informal dialogues
and consultations relating to security occur, and formal and informal links with
other regional institutions such as the EU, OSCE and UN have developed.
The ideational characteristic of governance has been central to the ongoing
transformation of the Alliance. NATO emerged from the end of the Cold War
period with a political agenda aimed at addressing a range of new security issues, in
particular sources of instability in Central and Eastern Europe, but in spite of this
forward-leaning intention Alliance rhetoric also seemed to imply that it remained
first and foremost a collective defence organisation. In particular, NATO remained
focused on the security of its territory and averse to operating militarily ‘out of
area’. In the first half of the 1990s this particular self-conception of its military role
in European security increasingly came into conflict with the material reality of
there being no obvious threatening external enemy and a growing argument that the
Alliance had to address the ongoing horrors of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.
The resulting debate pitched those member states who favoured a NATO still
essentially geared to the familiar but less relevant tasks of static territorial defence
against those who argued in favour of an Alliance ‘in the service of shared values
and common strategic interests’ – a debate about whether the Alliance would go ‘out
of area or out of business’.46 The latter view prevailed and NATO emerged in rhetoric
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and reality as an institution engaged in crisis management in locations outside of its
traditionally defined area of operation.47
The most powerful transformational idea in the 1990s, however, has been that
of enlargement. Enlargement was largely driven by the US, but the discourse
surrounding it gained a dynamic that resulted in three new members being
admitted in 1999 and then a further seven states being invited to join at the Prague
Summit in November 2002. Beyond these, a number of other states, most notably
Ukraine but also Georgia and Azerbaijan, have declared an interest in member-
ship, while serious debates on possible membership have also occurred in the
neutral states of Finland, Sweden and Austria. The hypothetical prospect of
membership, however remote, for Russia has even been broached.48 The possibility
of ongoing enlargement has raised a number of questions concerning a dilution of
NATO’s military effectiveness and an increased complexity of political decision-
making. In spite of these concerns, enlargement has bolstered NATO’s security
primacy in Europe; not only does it extend the scope of Alliance commitment
throughout the continent but it enhances its specifically European character. The
US will remain primus inter pares but inevitably more European members will
mean a consolidation of NATO more as a regional security organisation than as a
trans-Atlantic one.49
NATO’s continued adaptation through the 1990s and into the twenty-first century
has been purposeful. NATO through the 1990s increasingly represented itself as an
alliance of states joined together by common values of democracy, human rights
and the rule of law. Indeed, in the 1990 London Declaration, NATO stated that it
could, as ‘an agent of change . . . help build the structures of a more united
continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in
democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.’50
These and related liberal, capitalist values have served to furnish norms defining
what constitutes acceptable behaviour for non-member states in both their internal
and external activities, particularly if they aspire to become members. These values
and norms are not simply political rhetoric, they are embedded in such official
documents as the Membership Action Plan.51 These norms have served to socialise
non-member states in the way that they approach and conduct their political and
economic affairs, both internally and externally, thus creating a shared set of common
principles and ideals across a range of states which serve as a foundation for an
expanded zone of stability and security in Europe.
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In short, NATO has proven a durable and dynamic actor – a key agent in
building security governance in Europe. Specifically, NATO’s contribution can be
seen in at least four ways. First, there is an institutional or regulatory component,
in the shape of the organisational and military infrastructure of NATO itself coupled
with the variety of arrangements linking NATO with non-members. Second, NATO
has continued and, in some ways, has broadened its political purposes. The trans-
Atlantic link remains fundamental (even if subject to periodic strain) as does the
engineering of coordination and consensus on defence and security matters among
a growing number of European states. Third, NATO has assumed an authority
over a range of security-related issues. NATO may not be able satisfactorily to
encompass responses to all of these (the terrorism issue, for instance), but on issues
of peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, defence diplomacy, dialogue with partners
(Russia, notably) and so on, it is of principal significance. Fourth, the Alliance has
affirmed its position as an upholder of the ascendant set of values associated with
security governance. As Frank Schimmelfennig has recently argued, NATO cannot
simply be understood as a military alliance or the provider of shared security
goods. It is equally ‘an organisation [that represents] an international community of
[liberal] values and norms.’52 Those values may not be universally acceptable; or it
may be argued that NATO has perverted them.53 However, the Alliance does at
least claim them and, to some degree, act upon them; hence, the conditions of
membership presented to aspirants and the claim to be acting upon values as much
as interests in areas of intervention (most notably, the ‘humanitarian war’ over
Kosovo). 54
Europeanisation
The term ‘Europeanisation’ has been subject to two quite different uses.55 While
some use the term to designate changes in domestic policy as a result of supra-
national developments,56 others have used the term to designate the extension of a
policy field to the European level.57 Most mainstream literature prefers the expres-
sion European integration for this latter process.58 Thus, ‘Europeanisation’ has
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increasingly come to acquire the former of the above two meanings. However, the
impact of the European level on the national level is not the primary focus of this
study.59 That said, the use of the term ‘European integration’ to categorise the
processes we are analysing would also be quite inappropriate. Security and defence
policy have been rigorously excluded from the supranational shifts proposed by the
Convention on the Future of Europe. The use of the term ‘Europeanisation’ in this
study is therefore rather different from either of the traditional usages. We have used
it to explore the extent to which the European level is emerging as a necessary
framework for the elaboration of security policy, without this necessarily implying
integration as traditionally understood.
From the mid 1990s, a growing desire in Washington to shift the burden of
security provision onto the Europeans while still allowing the US to exert a decisive
influence, led to ESDI being developed within NATO. At one level, ESDI was
essentially a technical-military arrangement aimed at allowing access to NATO/US
assets by European Allies who would deploy them in operations to be conducted by
the WEU. Although subject to considerable organisational efforts within NATO,
ESDI proceeded slowly. Its greater significance, however, was political in that it
signalled both a readiness on the part of the US to countenance a greater security
role for the EU60 and determination on the part of the European Allies themselves
to take greater responsibility for security management. By the mid 1990s, however, it
was clear that ESDI offered little in the way of a distinct European security
competence. If the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) launched at
Maastricht was to be taken seriously it required significant, autonomous military
and institutional capacity. Hence the leap forward following the Franco-British Saint
Malo joint declaration on European defence in 1998 toward an ESDP housed within
the EU.61
Innovations such as CFSP, ESDI and ESDP suggest a growing complexity and
diffusion in the security governance of Europe. This complexity operates within the
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EU itself. While there is no doubt that national governments, through the European
Council, retain a tight control over policy outputs, the process of policy input and
deliberation, negotiation and cooperation has become infinitely more subtle and, at
the same time, more convoluted. This relates, specifically, to security governance in a
number of ways.
Taking heterarchy or the existence of multiple centres of power first, one major
feature of ESDP is its ambition for autonomy from NATO. Key documents refer to
the EU’s ‘autonomous capacity to take decisions’ and to ‘launch and conduct EU-
led military operations’ ‘where NATO as a whole is not engaged’.62 However, the EU
has devoted considerable energy to formalising relations with the Alliance on the
assumption that recourse to NATO assets and capabilities would be required in the
event of all but very small-scale EU-led operations. Further, there is limited support
within the EU itself for the development of an ESDP that is truly autonomous of
NATO and less still for the idea that ESDP be a step toward the ‘common defence’
of the Union noted at Maastricht and reiterated in the Treaties of Amsterdam and
Nice. ESDP documentation is clear in noting that the policy ‘does not imply the
creation of a European army’63 and the Treaty of Nice in Article 17 affirms that the
development of CFSP and ESDP should not prejudice the obligations of those
member states who view NATO as their chosen instrument of defence.64 Yet
notwithstanding the reality of the ongoing relationship between NATO and ESDP,
most recently enshrined in the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (December 2002),
there is no doubt that Europeanisation of security governance has brought into the
equation several new (and growing) power centres which did not exist at the time of
the Cold War: the European Council, the ESDP institutional nexus (see below), and,
eventually, a credible military force which, while not equating to a European army,
will nevertheless emerge as a power to be reckoned with.
Multiple actors are a second feature of Europeanisation. Formerly, defence policy
was decided – hierarchically – first in NATO, then interpreted by member state
governments, and finally implemented by defence ministries. Today, the picture is
very different. Quite apart from institutional multiplication involvng the EU,
the process of delivering security involves many actors whose inputs were pre-
viously negligible or non-existent. Post-conflict reconstruction – in the Balkans, in
Afghanistan and in Iraq – calls directly on the skills and resources of many private
and non-governmental actors from economic investors to judges, from construction
companies to policemen, from medical charities to administrators. The ‘war on
terrorism’ has also brought forth an unparalleled involvement in the delivery of
security by intelligence officers and networks, Interior Ministry officials, bankers and
investment brokers, police forces and other experts and agencies. The profusion of
think-tanks and specialist journals focusing on security issues, the unparalleled
attention paid to security by the media and the generation of policy options from
outside government are all factors which security decision-makers can ill afford to
ignore. Finally, where defence industries formerly confined their role to that of
accepting procurement orders from governments and (eventually) delivering the
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goods, today’s mega-companies function primarily in a global market-place and have
forced governments to act like customers.65 They have become, in short, essential
actors in the security governance process.
At the institutional level, the proliferation of committees and meetings – unilateral,
bilateral and multilateral – has led to a great deal of duplication and to a considerable
increase in the overall volume of work. More significantly, it has led to new tensions
between national capitals and centralising tendencies in Brussels. The latter comes in
two forms. First, as four separate clusters of Brussels-based permanent representatives
(the Committee of Permanent Representatives [Coreper], the PSC, the Policy Unit
attached to the High Representative – CFSP and the EUMS) get to know one another
and ‘consociationalise’, it is hard to imagine that they will not assume a greater and
greater tendency to develop a collective ethos of their own and to generate trans-
European perspectives on CFSP and ESDP. While this need not automatically lead
to tensions with the national capitals, it is almost certain to lead to a relative
strengthening of their roles and a possible corollary weakening of the formerly
unchallenged influence of Foreign Ministries.66 Second, the role of the European
Commission is assuming ever-greater importance, particularly in the field of civilian
crisis management, and it is the Commission which is largely responsible for the
implementation of ESDP/CFSP decisions and the management of the CFSP budget.
New institutional actors are being called into existence through the Convention
process – a permanent President of the Council, an EU Secretary of State, an
enhanced Commission President – all of whom will add to the institutional complexity
of ESDP and to the consolidation of governance practices.
Turning to the ideational issue, Europeanisation does not necessarily suggest a
complete harmony of European views. The EU includes nations such as Denmark
(which rejects outright the very principle of an autonomous EU military capacity),
France (which would like EU capacity to rival that of the US), the UK (which has a
centuries-old tradition of muscular intervention), Sweden (which has for long
emphasised conflict prevention and civilian peace-keeping), Greece (which has
potentially serious security problems on its borders) and Luxembourg (which has no
armed force worthy of the name). This differentiation is likely to become even more
pronounced once the EU enlarges from its current fifteen member states to twenty-
five after 2003. However, by the same token, the role of ideas and discourse, of
epistemic communities, in overcoming these national policy legacies has been and
will continue to be fundamental. The Saint-Malo ‘breakthrough’ was largely the
result of ideational interactions between a handful of key officials in Paris and
London who, in tussling with the problems of making WEU work, eventually
generated an alternative idea – ESDP – which led to the shelving of WEU and the
promotion of the EU as a new locus for the delivery of European security.67 The
gradual emergence of a coherent European security culture, already perceptible
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through the fog of national traditions,68 will be the great challenge of the coming
decades.
What all of this suggests is that the ideational significance of Europeanisation
resides in the fact that it is a process underpinned by conceptions, expressly
articulated within a European institutional context, of an appropriate security order
– one shared on both sides of the Atlantic. In many ways this has been a running
theme throughout the entire postwar history of European integration. As Laffan
et al. have argued, from its very inception in the 1950s, integration ‘was about
security as much as it was about economic integration […] Since then, a major
feature of the EC’s and then the EU’s role has been the stabilisation of western
Europe and – increasingly – of the “near abroad” in the wider Europe, the
Mediterranean and elsewhere.’69 The EU, indeed, has achieved considerable success
in this regard. In Western Europe, at least, it has made a fundamental contribution
to the creation of a Deutschian ‘pluralistic security community’. Since the end of the
Cold War, the EU (with American support) has embarked upon a course that is
aimed at consolidating this order (‘deepening’) while at the same time extending it
(‘widening’). This is a process that has been far from straightforward, and also at
times hesitant, ill-articulated and controversial among the member states.70 Yet, in
rather grand terms, two of the Union’s major projects, those of monetary union and
enlargement, fall within it. As for the particulars of the EU’s external role, here the
record of the 1990s was mixed. However, the hesitant but inexorable progress of
CFSP was significant in that it meant the development of conflict prevention as a
central feature of the EU’s external purpose.71 Adding modest military instruments
to this civilian capability has been a central rationale of ESDP.72
Thus, we discern the purposeful construction of a European framework for the
delivery of regional security. Security governance in the EU has been the result of a
growing awareness not only of the inadequacy of national solutions, but also of the
increasing limitations, in a changing post-Cold War world, of traditional Alliance
policies. Few NATO member states relish the prospect of transferring responsibility
for security and defence (ultimately the first and last bastions of sovereignty) to a
collective European entity. And yet, the history of European security initiatives over
the last fifty years (from the European Defence Community to ESDP) has witnessed
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the gradual articulation of a common approach. The involvement in this process of
heterarchical power centres, multiple actors, new institutions and ideational
exchanges has generated a powerful and purposeful momentum in favour of ESDP –
a process which saw France and Britain, at the Le Touquet summit in February
2003, moving resolutely ahead even as their representatives in the United Nations
were at loggerheads over US policy towards Iraq. The Europeanisation of security
has been the great political revolution of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.
Inclusion and exclusion in European security governance 
During the Cold War the security of Europe was bipolar and organised around
mutually exclusive spheres of influence. By contrast, the context of security gover-
nance after the Cold War has been increasingly determined by the continental
spread of the formerly ‘western’ sphere organised around the EU and NATO.
Alternatives in the shape of neutrality, pan-European structures such as the OSCE
or sub-regional groupings like the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and
Moldova) grouping have proven tenuous and lacking in credibility.73 The one alter-
native that might have mattered is that of American power, but in Europe at least
US policy has been fashioned through NATO – indeed, Europe appears to be one
region where American unilateralist impulses have been effectively restrained by
multilateral necessity.
The absence of alternatives does not, however, rule out a politics of exclusion.
The enlargement of NATO and the EU, as well as various procedures of association
and partnership with these bodies, has opened up the possibility of pan-European
integration,74 but as this inclusive prospect has unfolded it has brought with it,
paradoxically, exclusionary consequences. This has been apparent in four senses:
first, among those states who wish to enter enlarging organisations but are denied
membership (Turkey and Ukraine, for instance); second, among those states (most
notably, Russia) who eschew such an aspiration but who, as a consequence, perceive
themselves as marginalised and as having their status undermined; third, among
states (for example, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] under Milosevic) who
have actively opposed the dominant organisations; and fourth, among ‘forgotten
countries’ (such as Moldova and Belarus) outside the pale of enlargement and cast
adrift politically and economically.75
In one sense, it should come as no surprise that themes of inclusion and exclusion
have loomed large amidst Europe’s political reconfiguration. By definition, any form
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of political life rests upon some specification of what constitutes its component
parts and thus who or what is included or excluded.76 Thus, domestic politics usually
refers to citizens and subjects (of a state), or members (of a club, party, association
and so on).77 International politics, meanwhile, even when conceived of as principally
the realm of states, often sees states as conjoined or divided by differing degrees of
formal participation in joint endeavours. Yet how does this square with governance?
A governance perspective, after all, is one premised implicitly on inclusion given its
emphasis on a plurality of actors and multiple centres of power. Inclusiveness is
apparent in the construction of decisions through the accommodation of interests
and a search for consensus, through implementation that involves delivery by a wide
range of affected actors, and through the sanctions of a number of institutions and
regimes to enforce compliance when necessary.78 Governance when applied to
domestic settings does not assume, however, that inclusiveness is comprehensive or
equitable among actors.79 The same applies in international life. What is crucial,
however, is that the legitimacy and rationale of governance rests on inclusivity; thus,
while exclusion may be unavoidable in some senses, it is a phenomenon which systems
of governance seek to ameliorate rather than simply tolerate. Governance does not
eradicate exclusion, but it does involve processes for managing it.
Governance as noted above rests on an assumption of heterarchy and multiple
centres of power. Power in post-Cold War Europe is not, however, competitively
wielded as was the case with Cold War bipolarity. Rather than organising itself as a
system against a rival centre of power, security governance involves the incorpor-
ation of potential rivals. At one level, this was a method employed among Euro-
Atlantic states during the Cold War itself. Vanquished centres of power (Germany),
those in the ascendant (the US) and those on the wane (the UK and France) jointly
managed their common security and in the process jettisoned historical animosities
as well as maintaining the institutional edifices of west European stability, the EU
and NATO. Amidst the anguished debates over Iraq and the fractures within the EU
that surrounded negotiations over the Treaty of Nice and the European Convention,
it would be easy to overlook the fact that the EU and NATO have continued to play
this important function. In post-Cold War Europe, furthermore, the method has
been extended to post-communist and post-neutral Europe. Most significantly, what
had been a rival bloc – the Warsaw Pact – has disappeared, and consequent upon
enlargement the majority of its former members will have been absorbed into the
EU and NATO by 2004.
The important exception to this trend remains Russia. While prostrate as a great
power, Russia has retained an ability to affect the security of its neighbours. In some
cases (Moldova, Belarus, Armenia and, to a lesser degree, Ukraine) this has meant the
maintenance of dependent relations, while in others (Georgia) it has amounted to
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active destabilisation. Further, the Russian leadership under both Boris Yeltsin and
Vladimir Putin has continued to harbour grandiose ambitions, ‘an end-vision of
Russia’s place in the world’ that goes beyond the country becoming just a regional
power akin to the UK, Germany or France.80 Add to this geographic enormity,
undoubted material potential and fragile democratisation, then Russia could well be
set apart from the main dynamic of security governance in Europe. Should it recover
economically and achieve lasting political stability, Russia’s status as a rival could
well follow. Yet this is not the only possible outcome. Increasing economic inter-
dependence, the Russian elite’s increasing anxiety at the perceived challenges posed
by terrorism, criminality and Islamic fundamentalism to the south, as well as the
limitations of the Eurasian alternative premised on alliances within the CIS or with
China, all suggest that Europe is the ‘natural place for Russia’s own integration’.81
The record of Russian interaction in matters of European security, further, has been
one of ever-increasing cooperation at a practical level and resignation rather than
active opposition to initiatives (such as NATO enlargement and enforcement in the
Balkans) with which it has disagreed. This may at times have been premised on
pragmatic realism rather than conviction, but in the post-Soviet period, a
cooperative and generally Eurocentric orientation has become established as
arguably the main tendency of Russian foreign policy.82
The effort by NATO and the EU to manage and coordinate relations with Russia,
Ukraine and other states has been a basis for the multiplication of institutional
actors as discussed above. Russia’s engagement with Europe has occurred as a state-
level process (the Moscow-Paris-Berlin triangle, for instance), but this has been far
less substantive than Russia’s interaction with institutional actors. Deliberate and
considered institutionalisation has significantly contributed to the success of Russia’s
incorporation, indeed, the multiplicity of actors with which it has been faced has
blunted what might otherwise have been a much more singular and competitive
relationship.
With respect to institutionalisation, Moscow has been coupled to security gover-
nance in Europe by a number of specially-tailored arrangements: the NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council (and its replacement the NATO-Russia Council), separate
chains of command for its peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo and a panoply
of initiatives with the EU up to and including annual summit-level meetings, as well
as particular provisions on ESDP, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation and
disarmament. These have, on the one hand, pandered to its great-power aspirations
while, on the other, have facilitated enough substantive cooperation to be of more
than simply symbolic significance. Moscow, it is true, has often resented the fact that
it has had to ingratiate itself with the EU and NATO, two organisations not of its
making, but the long-term effect has been to offer it a channel of involvement with
the core bodies of security governance that has mitigated the sense of exclusion in
Moscow and reinforced the European perspective of its leadership.
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Beyond Russia, the dynamic of institutionalisation has been equally significant.
Enlargement first and foremost has extended institutionalised cooperation across the
continent. By May 2004 NATO will consist of 26 members and the EU 25, 19 of
which will be in common. As Antonio Missiroli has pointed out, ‘[t]aken together
the two organisations will cover almost all of continental Europe and represent a
majority within the OSCE’.83 Given the distinct possibility of Bulgarian and
Romanian entry into the EU in 2007 and the not improbable accessions of Albania,
Croatia and Macedonia into NATO at around the same time then the process of
continental integration and transnational governance will have been extended still
further. This, moreover, only caps a process of incorporation already well in train.
Since the mid 1990s both the EU and NATO have exerted a telling effect upon
aspirant states through the articulation of accession conditions, something that has
amounted de facto to an extension of governance beyond the specific geographic
area constituted by their formal memberships.84
Of course, enlargement does produce tensions. To be in the EU, for instance,
confers upon member state populations, freedom of movement and freedom to work
within the Union, legal protection provided by the European Court of Justice and
expectations of stable economic growth and integration. To be outside is to be
denied these benefits.85 The border which marks out those who enjoy the benefits of
membership from those who do not may in some senses be ‘soft’ (it is permeated by
migration, both legal and unregulated, as well as by transnational criminal activities)
but it has a ‘hard’ character also in the shape of the Schengen border regime – a
regime the new entrants are expected to enforce upon entry to the Union. For states
such as Russia and Ukraine who find themselves on the wrong side following
enlargement this is perceived as a very real source of exclusion and one, moreover,
that has overt security as well as societal implications.86
Further, the belated but ultimately expansive growth of NATO and the EU has,
in many respects, been demand-led. It has been driven by the aspirations of the
candidates based on a powerful mix of identity factors (the fabled ‘return to
Europe’), security predicaments (insurance against regional destabilisation as in the
former Yugoslavia and ensuring distance from Russia) and, in the case of NATO,
getting as close as possible to the US. Yet as enlargement has proceeded, to be left
out of the process appears increasingly anomalous, the source of a sense of
insecurity and potential abandonment. For Albania, Macedonia and Croatia the
desire to join NATO has been made that much more urgent by the failure to receive
formal invitations at NATO’s Prague summit. A similar point can be made regarding
Turkey’s spurned aspirations regarding the EU. Even greater is the sense of exclu-
sion felt in Georgia and among Eurocentric elites in Ukraine – where real but
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probably unrealisable aspirations for NATO and EU membership have developed, in
part as a means of countering overweening Russian influence.
Exclusion, however, is not total. What is significant about security governance is
the development of forms of institutional cooperation which blur the formal
distinction between those who are and those who are not members of its core
organisations. Initiatives emanating from NATO provide coverage of the entire
Eurasian landmass. This is true of the EAPC and its 27 members that are incor-
porated within the PFP programme, a large number of whom have partaken in
Alliance-led peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, an initiative which in
its own right has meant the establishment of de facto NATO protectorates in the
Balkans. The EU, similarly, has gone to great lengths to fashion forms of association
with non-members over ESDP.87
The ideational basis of security governance also demonstrates a tendency
towards inclusivity, albeit again one accompanied by certain tensions. One manifest-
ation of this is the meaning that has been attached to ‘Europeaness’ after the Cold
War. At one level, this has a seemingly straightforward geographic application for
NATO and EU enlargement have been premised on the geographic (that is,
European) credentials of membership candidates. This was also the case during the
Cold War, but the stricture was meaningless in the context of East-West division.
NATO and the EU, indeed Western Europe in general, were defined in juxtaposition
to the ‘other Europe’ that was both spatially and, to some degree, culturally
separate.88 This separateness was modified in its essentials with the Cold War’s
demise. Both Article X of NATO’s Washington Treaty and Article 237 of the Treaty
of Rome had stipulated that membership of the Alliance and of the EU be open to
any European state, and in consequence the political leaderships of many post-
communist states have gone to considerable lengths to emphasise their European
location. This claim to inclusion has been relatively straightforward for some – the
Poles, the Hungarians and the Czechs, for instance, have a valid geographic claim to
be at the centre of Europe. For others, it has been a much more troubling matter.
While none would dispute that the former Soviet Central Asian states are outside of
Europe (although even this has not precluded their membership of the OSCE), the
status of the Transcaucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as well as
of Turkey is much less clear-cut. Reflecting these uncertainties, neither the EU or
NATO has been able to offer a succinct definition of what constitutes the region of
Europe and thus where the geographic boundaries of their dual processes of
enlargement lie.
Of course, ‘Europeaness’ is not simply a matter of geography; the meaning of
Europe is also a matter of purposeful construction. The EU, in particular, has done
much to stress the notion of European values and these tend to equate with its
conditions of membership. While less explicitly European (given the predilections of
the Americans), the conditions of NATO entry have been similar. The values of
economic liberalisation, democracy, the rule of law, the professionalisation of
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government bureaucracies and civilian oversight of the armed forces constitute the
basis upon which new and candidate states of the EU and NATO have been incor-
porated into these two crucial organisations of security governance. The emphasis
on these values and the practical processes of conditionality and socialisation which
have followed has fundamentally transformed domestic governance in a number of
post-communist states89 as well as laying the ideational basis for inclusion in the
broader international processes of security governance. In so doing, however, it
leaves certain states in its wake. What matters in this regard is not necessarily
inadequacies in matching up to the ‘Westernistic’ community of norms, but rather to
be seen to be actively opposing them. There is a world of difference between, on the
one hand, Bulgaria, Romania or Albania, states which are formally committed
through process of accession and consequent security cooperation to these norms,
and, on the other, states which openly flout them both in their domestic practices
and foreign policies – states such as Serbia under Milosevic, Belarus under
Aleksandr Lukashenko or, even at times, Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma. Only
Russia seems to have escaped censure in this regard (despite its departure from
European norms in Chechnya) a level of toleration that reflects the necessity of
accommodation noted above.
The foregoing demonstrates that security governance does have an inclusive basis
in Europe even if this is not entirely comprehensive or equal. Inclusion has occurred
not through the elaboration of institutions and norms that reflect some new
expanded sense of European community created ab initio after the Cold War.
Rather, it has been premised on previously excluded states joining (or, in some cases,
finding accommodation with) a pre-existing community still anchored in western
Europe and north America, the institutions and norms of which have underpinned a
system of security governance with claims to pan-European relevance. Insofar as
this is a system with purpose, it is a purpose that has been defined by its western
origins, the manner in which the system’s two institutional offspring (NATO and the
EU) have interacted and, within this context, how the Western powers have aggreg-
ated their preferences. The security orientations of NATO and the EU covered in the
previous sections have dominated discourse and practice in Europe. In some
instances, these have not been discordant with those outside these organisations. The
effort at promoting stability in the Balkans, albeit ineffective for long periods and
problematic in all manner of respects, cannot be entirely separated from the
concerns of established governments in Bosnia, Macedonia or Albania. In other
cases, however, this discourse and the actions it gives rise to are in contradiction with
the preferences of non-members and this is a tension that has some very practical
repercussions. First, in terms of how governance structures manage relations with
the ‘excluded’. This has been sometimes through a policing function (as in the case
of deviant states such as, formerly, the FRY) and at other times attempted
accommodation on terms acceptable to the ‘included’ (as in the case of potential
system destabilisers such as Russia or, in the particular case of ESDP, special
provisions geared towards Turkey).
The second repercussion concerns how the excluded frame their own foreign and
domestic policies in a regional setting seemingly not of their own making. Exactly
24 Mark Webber et al.
89 See A.C. Janos, ‘From Eastern Empire to Western Hegemony: East Central Europe under Two
International Regimes’, East European Politics and Societies, 15:2 (2001), pp. 221–49.
what course this takes depends upon the extent of exclusion and where the state
stands with regard to the underlying norms which security governance aspires to
uphold. Should it, in other words, pursue a foreign policy (and indeed, promote a
domestic political and economic order) consistent with a higher degree of inclusion
or should it, rather, seek to revise that system and lay down its own terms for
incorporation?90
Conclusion
Our view of security governance in post-Cold War Europe has been premised on
three assumptions. First, that the meaning of ‘security’ has changed both conceptu-
ally and in policy terms. Second, that there is a need to identify the manner of this
change and its underlying dynamics. And third, that states and the international
organisations through which they act remain the dominant actors of security; two in
particular are key in this regard – NATO, first and foremost, and the EU to a lesser
extent. These assumptions, in turn, have led us to suggest that Europe is character-
ised by heterarchy, or multiple centres of power, a multiplication of actors involved
in the provision of security, and highly developed forms of institutionalisation and
community building, with these forms being extended across the continent,
functionally within the sphere of security and geographically through enlargement
and partnership. These processes are, in turn, accompanied by an ideational dis-
course (apparent not least over the issue of Europeanisation) and a dynamic
relationship between inclusion and exclusion.
This article has demonstrated that a governance perspective offers a useful
framework for understanding and conceptualising these developments. Pierre and
Peters have noted that governance approaches exhibit a tension ‘between governance
as phenomenon and governance as theory or analytical framework’.91 Our claim,
nonetheless, is that governance in the context of European security is useful on both
counts; it is a framework that describes and elucidates some of the core features of
the actuality of Europe’s security relations.
The dynamism of the concept lies in its ability to apprehend some of the key
questions of post-Cold War security management. Why has the institutionalisation
of security placed a premium on NATO (an organisation which endures despite
persistent claims of its demise) and also on the EU (an organisation whose security
functions once only implicit have become increasingly overt)? While not fully
developed, security governance offers an explanation that is alert to functionalist
explanations associated with institutionalism, power-based perspectives which con-
sider state preferences, and ideational (or constructivist) considerations which allow
for norms as driving influences. Of course, this opens the concept up to charges of
theoretical sloppiness and a more extended formulation would require its synthetic
qualities to be more rigorously articulated. Yet tentatively perhaps, governance
provides a framework of analysis that can ascertain how the ‘rules’ of security
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develop – insofar as it focuses on how such rules are imprinted within institutions
(both in their normative claims and their policy actions), institutions which then act
as vehicles for extending and entrenching such rules beyond what had been their
core areas of functional and geographic competence. Similarly, governance is a lens
that can help understand how security is produced. Its focus on states, organisations
and norms allows for a multifaceted approach to the interpretation of threat. The
post-‘9/11’ emphasis on terrorism, for instance, is not just the consequence of the
increased prominence of a new challenge ‘out there in the real world’ (although this
material reality is part of it). What matters is how this threat has been interpreted
and acted upon. Terrorism is a particularly noteworthy case because it is a challenge
both to the traditional prerogatives of the state (the protection of citizens from
external danger), is contrary to the norms of the liberal democratic community and
is an affront to the efficacy of organisations such as the EU and NATO whose claim
to be the providers of security can no longer be judged (as it was during the Cold
War) by reference to an armed mirror-image of themselves.
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